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I. INTRODUCTION
Concern about widespread environmental contamination caused by
industrial pollution and the health hazards associated with hazardous
waste has made a clean environment one of the paramount scientific,
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Indiana University School of Business.
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social, and political goals of our time. The costs of addressing the
problems are staggering. Recent estimates suggest that the cost of
cleaning up the nation's hazardous waste sites will approach $500 bil-
lion dollars.' The average cleanup cost for a Superfund site today is
$25 million dollars, and the cost of the investigation and study portion
for such a site averages three million dollars.2
Considering the enormous costs involved in hazardous waste site
cleanup, it is not surprising that parties who potentially may be liable
for the costs of such cleanups are willing to invest substantial sums in
litigation to avoid or minimize that liability. The mammoth price tag
for cleaning up the nation's worst hazardous waste sites encourages
parties to litigate because the costs of litigating are often less than the
costs of remedying hazardous waste contamination. But litigation
does not further the ultimate goal of a clean environment. Rather, it
consumes resources that could be spent on cleanup while postponing
an ultimate solution to the problem of hazardous waste
contamination.
Passage of comprehensive federal and state environmental legisla-
tion, like the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or Superfund)3 passed in 1980, signifi-
cantly expanded the potential liability of corporate defendants for
hazardous waste contamination by imposing strict, joint and several
liability on multiple owners, operators, generators and transporters
for the costs of cleaning up hazardous waste sites.4 In addition, indi-
vidual plaintiffs who have suffered bodily injury and property damage
because of industrial pollution may recover damages from corporate
polluters under traditional tort theories of trespass, nuisance, and
strict liability.5
As a result of the large scale costs associated with liability for envi-
ronmental pollution, corporate defendants have turned to their insur-
ers for defense and reimbursement of costs under the terms of a
comprehensive general liability policy (CGL policy). Many courts
have been willing to impose liability on insurers for CERCLA cleanup
costs and for damages associated with environmental pollution under
the terms of CGL policies. In some cases, insureds have sought de-
fense and indemnification under policies that expired long before the
damages caused by pollution became manifest. In determining the
point in time when insurance coverage is "triggered" by the terms of
1. Marianne Lavelle, Industry, Insurers at Odds, NAT'L L. J., Mar. 30, 1992, at 1, 1.
2. Jarred 0. Taylor, Cleaning Up the Dirty Nes" Who Pays for Environmental
Cleanup? ENViRONmENTAL COVERAGE: FROM INTERPRETATION To LITIGATION,
1991 A.B.. SEC. TORT & INS. PRAC. 1.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
4. See infra notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol, 855 F.2d. 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
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the policy, many courts have relied on traditional techniques of statu-
tory interpretation as well as broad principles of public policy to im-
pose a trigger that effectively maximizes insurance coverage in such
cases.
Insurers have aggressively fought imposition of liability under the
terms of comprehensive general liability policies, arguing that the lan-
guage of the standardized CGL policy is not ambiguous and that liabil-
ity for environmental damages and cleanup costs is excluded by the
terms of the policy. Substantial litigation continues as insurers and
insureds battle over the meaning of words like "occurrence," "sudden
and accidental" and "expected or intended" in the language of the
standard CGL policy and its standard "pollution exclusion" clause.
Meanwhile, litigation expenses continue to increase, with money
spent on transaction costs associated with litigation rather than on the
costs of cleaning polluted sites.
In April 1992, the RAND Institute for Civil Justice issued a report
that is sure to fuel demands to resolve some of the uncertainty sur-
rounding insurer liability for environmental damage and cleanup
costs. According to that report, insurance companies are paying out
nearly $500 million dollars annually for Superfund-related liabilities,
but only an average of twelve percent goes for actual cleanup; legal
fees and transaction costs unrelated to actual cleanups accounts for
eighty-eight percent of the funds expended.6 The study also found
that insurers' Superfund costs are escalating rapidly, with insurers
spending $470 million on such claims in 1989, almost double their 1986
outlays.7 According to the RAND report, the transaction costs associ-
ated with Superfund liabilities are far higher than those for other
lines of property-casualty insurance, almost tripling that for CGL in-
surance as a whole.8
This Article examines the legal issues involved in the determina-
tion of insurer liability for environmental property damage and
cleanup costs under the terms of a CGL and focuses on a significant
question in environmental coverage disputes: When is coverage for
environmental damage triggered under the terms of a CGL policy? To
that end, the first section reviews statutory and common law princi-
ples under which liability for environmental property damage may be
imposed on corporate polluters. The next section discusses the stan-
dard comprehensive general liability policy by reviewing the history of
that policy and the language of the standard CGL policy. Section III of
the Article focuses on the meaning of an "occurrence" in the language
of a standard policy, and examines the significance of four "triggers"
6. Insurers Spending Hundreds of Millions, But Most Goes for Legal Fees, Not





of coverage developed by the courts in order to define the time of an
"occurrence" for purposes of policy coverage: "exposure"; "injury in
fact"; "manifestation" and the "triple or continuous trigger." The fi-
nal section of the Article discusses the courts' use of traditional tech-
niques of statutory construction to achieve perceived public policy
benefits in insurance environmental liability cases and suggests that
the consequences of that approach have created an environment of un-
certainty that has led to increased litigation and decreased availability
of environmental liability insurance. If we are to proceed with the
business of cleaning up the nation's hazardous waste sites, incentives
to minimize rather than maximize insurer/insured litigation must be
developed so that the funds expended on Superfund costs can be ap-
plied toward the costs of cleanup rather than on transaction costs asso-
ciated with litigation.
II. CERCLA AND COMMON LAW LIABILITY FOR
INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION
The past few decades have witnessed an unexpected and unparal-
leled passage of a series of powerful federal and state environmental
laws designed to address the substantial problems of environmental
pollution affecting land, water and air throughout the nation. Passage
of comprehensive environmental legislation, such as the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)9 in 1976 and the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CER-
CLA) in 1980, created a whole new legal environment in which
businesses and their insurers evaluate the potential liability of indus-
trial polluters.0 Prior to passage of CERCLA and the state laws
modeled after it, the liability of an owner or operator of a polluted site
for risks such as off-site leakage was generally perceived to be small.11
Because it seemed unlikely that courts would impose significant
waste-related liabilities on insurers, comprehensive general liability
insurance was available at prices that did not truly reflect an indus-
trial defendant's risk of liability for on- and off-site pollution under
environmental laws in effect today.12
CERCLA (or Superfund) created a broad framework under which
multiple parties can be held strictly liable for the costs of cleaning up a
9. Congress passed RCRA as an amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965
to address the specific problem of hazardous waste disposal. Pub. L. No. 94-580,
94 Stat. 2795-2841 (1976)(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (1988)).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (West 1983 & supp. 1990).
11. Note, Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458,
1575 (1986). Under the common law, concepts of negligence, agency and in-
dependent contractor limited the liability of parties contributing to environmen-
tal pollution. See Comment, Liability for CERCLA Cleanup Costs-Are Insurers
the Victims of Judicial Activism? 26 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 221, 222 (1991).
12. Note, supra note 11, at 1575.
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facility contaminated by a hazardous substance. Under CERCLA, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the power to assess lia-
bility for cleanup of hazardous substances at any site where hazardous
substances have come to be located.13 The definition of "hazardous
substance"14 and "facility"15 under CERCLA is extremely broad, and
virtually any contaminated site can be subject to cleanup under provi-
sions of the act.16 CERCLA gives the EPA the power to order a re-
sponsible party to clean up a contaminated site or to clean up the site
itself and recover cleanup costs from a responsible party.17 There are
four classes of "potentially responsible parties" (or "PRPs") who may
be strictly liable' 8 for cleanup costs under the act: (1) current owners
and operators of the contaminated site; (2) those who owned or oper-
ated the site when disposal occurred; (3) generators of hazardous sub-
stances; and (4) transporters of hazardous substances.19 Liability
under CERCLA is joint and several; therefore, multiple parties (own-
ers, operators, generators, and transporters) may be liable for the con-
tamination of a particular site.20 As a result, a party to a CERCLA
action may find his liability increased because of the actions of another
party over whom he had no control.21
CERCLA does not provide third parties injured by industrial pol-
lution a cause of action for personal injury or property damage associ-
ated with hazardous waste contamination, but individual plaintiffs
may recover substantial damages from industrial defendants under
traditional common law tort actions for trespass, nuisance, negligence,
and strict liability. Residents living near a corporation's chemical
13. New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 296 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
14. Substances designated as hazardous or toxic under the Clean Water Act, RCRA,
the Clean Air Act, or TSCA are incorporated by reference into CERCLA. In
some cases, the definition may include nonhazardous substances that contain
trace concentrations of hazardous substances. United States v. Conservation
Chem. Corp., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
15. "Facility" includes any site where a hazardous substance is located. United States
v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
16. See I&L
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(a), 9606(b)(2)(A).
18. A potentially responsible party under CERCLA may be strictly liable for the
costs of cleaning up the site. Consequently, an owner of a contaminated site is a
potentially responsible party ("PRP") under CERCLA who may be liable regard-
less of when the pollution occurred or whether the contamination could have
been foreseen. Note, Environmental Cleanup Costs and Insurance: Seeking a
Solution, 24 GA. L. REV. 705, 710 (1990).
19. 42 U.S.C. sec. 9607(a)(West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
20. For example, generators of hazardous waste are liable as "potentially responsible
parties" under CERCLA. Thus all industries who disposed of contaminants at a
particular industrial waste site may be liable for costs of cleanup. Abraham, Envi-
ronmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 942, 957
(1988).
21. Note, Environmental Cleanup Costs and Insurance: Seeking a Solution, supra
note 18, at 710.
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waste site, for example, have recovered substantial damages from cor-
porate defendants on the theory that the corporation's activities were
ultrahazardous and/or abnormally dangerous and that the injury to
neighboring landowners was a reasonably foreseeable result of its
activities. 22
Today an industrial defendant may become the target of many dif-
ferent legal actions arising from the past manufacture or disposal of
toxic materials under these statutory and common law principles,
even in cases where substances were not known to be toxic at the time
of manufacture or disposal. Corporate defendants then become corpo-
rate plaintiffs suing their insurers for defense or indemnification
under standard CGL policies in order to recover cleanup costs man-
dated by government agencies or damages awarded to plaintiffs in
common law environmental actions. The result is another layer of lit-
igation, increased "transaction" costs for insureds and insurers, and
delay in cleanup and damage awards to injured parties.23
22. Sterling v. Velsicol, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
23. For example, in Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Insurance, 3 Cal. App. 4th
1511, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1992), petition for rev. granted May 21,
1992, discussed infra at notes 108-30, Montrose Chemical Corporation, a defunct
chemical company which manufactured DDT for use in pesticides from 1947 until
1982, sought a declaration that its general liability insurer had a duty to defend
and indemnify it in five different actions alleging property damage and bodily
injuries as a result of contamination of certain sites where Montrose manufac-
tured its product or disposed of its hazardous wastes. The superior court had
granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, but the court of appeals re-
versed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case. The Insurance Environ-
mental Litigation Association, representing twenty big commercial insurers, filed
an amicus curiae brief in the case, as did lawyers for six policyholders. Litigation
costs will probably continue to rise in the case because a petition for certiorari
will likely be filed with the California Supreme Court. Stacy Gordon, Broad Pol-
lution Coverage Granted: 'Continuous Trigger' Ruling Regarded as Major Vic-
tory for Policyholders, Bus. INs., Mar. 9, 1992, at 1, 77.
Different issues underlying insurer liability for environmental damage have
been addressed in recent books and articles. See, e.g., Kenneth H. Mack, Insur-
ance Coverage of Environmental Claims, REAL EsTATE LAW AND PRACTICE, 1990
PRACTICING L. INsT. 485; John J. O'Leary, Current Trends in CGL Insurance Cov-
erage for Environmental Claims: An Introduction to Some Key Coverage Issues,
ENviRoNmENAL COVERAGE: FROM INTERPRETATION TO LITIGATION, 1991 A.B.A.
SEC. TORT & INsuR. 95. Other articles include Abraham, Environmental Liabil-
ity and the Limits of Insurance, supra note 20; Nancer Ballard and Peter M.
Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the Comprehensive General Liabil-
ity Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 610 (1990); Theodore Hadzi-Antich,
Coverage for Environmental Liabilities Under the Comprehensive General Lia-
bility Insurance Policy: How to Walk a Bull Through a China Shop, 17 CONN. L.
REV. 769 (1985); George Pendygraft, George M. Plews, James W. Clark, Peter C.
Wright, Who Pays for Environmental Damage: Recent Developments in CER-
CLA Liability and Insurance Coverage Litigation, 21 IND. L. REV. 117 (1988);
Note, The Applicability of General Liability Insurance to Hazardous Waste Dis-
posal, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1984); Note, Environmental Cleanup Costs and In-
surance: Seeking a Solution, supra note 18; Note, Developments-Toxic Waste
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III. INSURER LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES
UNDER A COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY
POLICY
The standard CGL policy provides coverage for bodily injury and
property damage which occurs during the policy period. As a general
rule, and subject to other policy terms and conditions, a CGL insurer's
duty to indemnify is "triggered" by a determination that "fortuitous
bodily injury or property damage" occurred during the policy period.24
Prior to 1966, most comprehensive general liability insurance policies
were "accident" policies-that is, they generally covered liability of an
insured caused by an "accident." The term "accident" was not defined
by the policy.25 After 1966, the standard policy language was changed
to substitute the word "occurrence" for "accident." The change was
intended to make it clear that an insured event was not limited to sud-
den events but that an insured event could also include personal inju-
ries and property damage resulting from gradual processes. 2 6 After
1966, the standardized "occurrence" policy typically read:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or
property damage to which this insurance applied, caused by an occurrence,
and the Company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the
insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or property damage,
even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or
fraudulent .... 27
After 1973, "occurrence" was defined in the standard CGL policy to
make it clear that suddenness was not a requirement: "'Occurrence'
means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to con-
ditions, which results in personal injury or property damage neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."2
In the mid-1970s, the insurance industry first inserted a pollution
exclusion clause into the standard CGL policy. This standardized
"pollution exclusion" clause was used until the mid-1980s, when it was
replaced by an "absolute" pollution clause which purports to exclude
liability for pollution-related occurrences. 2 9 The standard "pollution
exclusion" clause used by the insurance industry between the mid-
1970s and 1980s provided:
This policy does not apply to bodily injury or property damage arising out of
the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids,
Litigation, supra note 11; Comment, Liability for CERCLA Cleanup Costs--Are
Insurers the Victims of Judicial Activism?, supra note 11.
24. BARRY R. OSTRAGER AND THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COV-
ERAGE DIsPUTES, § 7.01 (1990).
25. O'Leary, supra note 23, at 104.
26. Hadzi-Antich, supra note 23, at 780.
27. Mack, supra note 23, at 488.
28. Id-
29. O'Leary supra note 23 at 114.
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alkalines, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants,
contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water
course or body of water, but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge,
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.3 0
The standardized language of the CGL policy, particularly the defi-
nition of "occurrence," "damages," and the words "sudden and acci-
dental" in the pollution exclusion clause have provided fertile ground
for parties debating whether a CGL policy provides coverage for site-
specific cleanup costs mandated under CERCLA and/or for personal
injury and property damages to third parties resulting from hazardous
waste pollution. The cases focus on several issues: When does an
event "occur" for purposes of the policy-that is, when is coverage of
the policy "triggered?"31 Does the term "damages" in the standard
policy language include environmental cleanup costs mandated under
CERCLA, or is the term limited to money damages "at law?"3 2 Is an
event "expected or intended" for purposes of the policy if the insured
should have expected the event, or does the pollution exclusion apply
where the damage to person or property, rather than the polluting
event, was unexpected or unintended?33 Does the CGL policy apply in
cases where the property is owned or occupied by the insured, or does
it cover on-site pollution which could extend off-site, thereby causing
an insurable event unless the pollution on-site is remedied? What is
the meaning of "sudden and accidental" within the pollution exclusion
clause?
Relying on traditional rules of contract interpretation, courts have
reached different conclusions about the meaning of these words in
standard CGL policy language. For example, the meaning of the word
"damages" in the standardized language of the CGL policy is one issue
frequently litigated by insureds and insurers in environmental insur-
ance cases. Some courts have ruled that the word "damages" does not
include CERCLA cleanup costs mandated by the government because
monetary claims under CERCLA and its state counterparts are "equi-
table" in nature.34 A majority of states, however, now support the
view that CERCLA costs should be covered as "damages" under a
30. Id. at 115.
31. See, eg., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Cal. App. 2
Dist. 1992).
32. See, e.g., Continental Ins. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 811 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir.
1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988).
33. The definition of "occurrence" in the standardized CGL policy provides that an
"occurrence" is "an accident, including exposure to conditions, resulting in injury
or property damage neither expected or intended from the standpoint of the in-
sured." Insurers may deny coverage by maintaining that a discharge and/or re-
sulting injury was either expected or intended. The case law is split on whether
"expected or intended" refers to the discharge, not the injury. O'Leary, supra
note 23, at 104-08 (citations omitted).
34. These courts hold that the equitable relief sought is a mandatory injunction that
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CGL policy, based upon a determination that an ordinary insured
should not be reasonably expected to understand the distinction be-
tween equitable remedies and damages "at law."35
CERCLA cleanup costs were unknown to and therefore unantici-
pated by insurers who issued CGL policies prior to passage of the stat-
ute in 1980.36 Presumably the parties could not have actually intended
to include such costs as damages covered under the policy at the time
the policy was issued, because such liability was unknown. But be-
cause it makes little legal or policy sense not to include these costs as
damages, and because there is no real principled distinction between
costs and damages, most, but by no means all, courts have interpreted
CERCLA costs to constitute damages for purposes of the CGL
policy.37
Another frequently litigated issue in hazardous waste insurance
coverage disputes is the meaning of "sudden and accidental" in the
standard CGL pollution exclusion clause. This clause excludes cover-
age for bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge,
dispersal, release or escape of contaminants or pollutants, but it does
not exclude coverage if the discharge, dispersal, release or escape is
"sudden and accidental." On its face, the language of the exclusion
appears to exclude liability for non-sudden and non-accidental pollu-
tion events, but courts have utilized several theories to avoid limiting
an insurer's liability to sudden events under this clause.38 Some
courts have found the words "sudden and accidental" to be ambiguous,
and on this basis have redefined the terms "sudden and accidental" to
mean "unexpected, unusual and unforeseen."3 9 For example, in an
early New Jersey case, Lansco Inc. v. Department of Environmental
Protection,40 an unknown person released 14,000 gallons of oil from an
the PRP pay money damages or clean up a site. Continental Ins. v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical, 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 408 U.S. 821 (1988).
35. Avondale Industries, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F. 2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989).
Other cases supporting this position include: United States Aviex Co. v. Travel-
ers Ins., Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 336 N.W.2d 838 (1983), AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court (FMC Corp.) 799 P.2d 1253, (Cal. 1990), and C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v.
Industrial Crankshaft, 388 S.E.2d 557 (1990); Contra Continental Insurance Co. v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 842 F.2d 977, (8th Cir. 1988); Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430 (D. Md. 1986). See generally O'Leary, supra
note 23, at 99-104.
36. Courts supporting the equitable/legal distinction, however, maintain that the dis-
tinction is more than technical, because clean up costs may amount to far more
than conventional legal damages. Continental Ins. v. Northeastern Pharmaceuti-
cal, 842 F.2d 977, 986 (8th Cir. 1988).
37. Pendygraft et. al., supra note 23, at 151.
38. Courts have refused to enforce the clause because the damage or injury was un-
foreseen or unintended, the pollutants were no industrial pollutants, or the in-
sured was not the actual polluter. Hadzi-Antich, supra note 23 at 792-93.
39. Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
40. 350 A.2d 520 (N.J. 1975).
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insured's tanks which eventually leaked into a river and reservoir.
The New Jersey court held the standard pollution exclusion clause in
the company's CGL policy was inapplicable because the spill was "un-
intended" from the standpoint of the insured.41 By equating "sudden
and accidental" with "unintended," the Lansco Court made the pollu-
tion exclusion the effective equivalent of an "occurrence," as it is de-
fined in the standard CGL policy.42 The result is to render the
pollution exclusion clause essentially meaningless.4 3
Other courts, however, have found the "sudden and accidental"
clause unambiguous, and have applied the exclusion in favor of insur-
ers by construing a temporal limitation into the clause or by interpret-
ing the words "sudden and accidental" to modify the release, not the
resulting injury.44 Of those state supreme courts construing the stan-
dard pollution exclusion clause, at least three have held for policy-
holders and three for insurers.45 The courts have also split over which
party, an insured or insurer, has the burden of proving an event was
"sudden and accidental."46
IV. TRIGGERING INSURANCE LIABILITY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP COSTS OR DAMAGES
UNDER THE STANDARD CGL POLICY
No other issue better represents the disparity of interpretations of
CGL policy language in environmental liability cases than the ques-
tion of when an event "occurs" for purpose of triggering insurance
coverage under the policy. Recent cases determining the appropriate
trigger of coverage under a CGL policy not only raise questions of con-
tract interpretation, they also raise a policy question of substantial im-
portance in insurance coverage disputes: Under what circumstances,
if any, should the insurance industry bear the costs of cleaning up in-
dustrial toxic waste and compensating the victims of environmental
pollution under the terms of a standard CGL policy?
41. Id.
42. The standard policy defines an occurrence as "an accident, including continuous
or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in personal injury or property
damage neither expected no intended from the standpoint of the insured." Mack,
supra note 23, at 488.
43. Note, Environmental Cleanup Costs and Insurance, supra note 18, at 715.
44. See O'Leary, supra note 23, at 116-17, citing Great Lakes Container Corp. v. Na-
tional Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984), and FL Aerospace v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 897 F. 2d 214 (6th Cir. 1990).
45. Wisconsin, Georgia and Alabama have held for policyholders by interpreting
"sudden and accidental" as the equivalent or unexpected or unintended damage,
while Massachusetts, New York, and North Carolina have held for insurers by
finding the word "sudden" to require an abrupt release of pollutants. O'Leary,
supra note 23, at 118-19 (citations omitted).
46. I& at 120.
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The typical comprehensive general liability policy requires an in-
surer to pay all sums which an insured becomes legally obligated to
pay as damages because of (1) bodily injury or (2) property damage...
caused by an occurrence. 47 This language is generally interpreted to
mean that insurance coverage is triggered when the bodily injury or
property damage takes place during the effective dates of the policy.48
In defining an "occurrence" for purposes of triggering coverage under
a CGL policy, courts generally focus on the moment the damage oc-
curred rather than the time of the wrongful act, and the moment the
injury occurred may differ depending on whether the occurrence re-
sulted in personal injury or damage to real property.
A. Triggering an Occurrence in Personal Injury Cases-the Asbestos
Cases
In many toxic torts cases involving bodily injury, like those involv-
ing personal injuries from exposure to asbestos, bodily injury occurs at
the moment of exposure to the toxic substance and continues to evolve
over a long period of time, ultimately resulting in the manifestation of
sickness and disease such as asbestosis.49 In some cases where manu-
facturers of asbestos have sought defense and indemnification from
CGL insurers in personal injury cases brought by plaintiffs exposed to
asbestos, the manufacturers have successfully argued that liability
coverage under the standard CGL policy is a "continuous trigger"-
that is, liability is continuously triggered from the moment in time
when an injured plaintiff is exposed to asbestos fibers through the
time when the injury manifests itself.5 0 The definition of "bodily in-
jury" in the CGL policy helps support this argument. "Bodily injury"
is defined by the policy to include not only bodily injury, but also sick-
47. Hadzi-Antich, supra note 23, at 781. Most CGL policies in environmental claims
cases are"occurrence" policies rather than "claims made" policies. An "occur-
rence" policy requires the insurer to respond, even after expiration of the policy,
to an occurrence that happened during the policy term. A "claims-made" policy
only covers claims actually made during the policy period. Montrose Chem.
Corp. v. Admiral Ins., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1992).
48. Hadzi-Antich, supra note 23, at 781.
49. Evidence suggests that asbestosis begins when a person first inhales asbestos fi-
bers, and that the lungs are continuously punctured with every inhalation and
expiration. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus., 514 N.E.2d 150, 155 (1987).
50. I& The landmark asbestos case establishing this "continuous trigger" theory is
Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Discussing that case, one court was held, "Keene, involving the exact controversy
before us, was decided with an eye toward the predominant purpose of purchas-
ing liability insurance which, basically, included Keene's reasonable expectation
that by purchasing liability insurance it would be insured against liability for as-
bestos related injury and disease." J.H. France Refractories v. Allstate Ins., Co.,
578 A.2d 468, 473 (Pa. Super. 1990).
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ness or disease.51 In addition to "injury" under the policy, sickness or
disease are separate and distinct triggers of coverage. Thus under the
express language of the policy, an occurrence of each or any of these
events-injury, sickness, or disease-should trigger coverage.52
J.H. France Refractories Company v. Allstatess is an example of a
case where a court applied a continuous trigger in the context of asbes-
tos litigation. In J.H. France, J.H. France Refractories filed an action
to determine its insurance coverage among various insurers with re-
spect to asbestos-related lawsuits. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supe-
rior Court held that the entire asbestos disease process from first
exposure to manifestation was an event triggering coverage of the in-
surer's obligation under a CGL policy covering products liability.
The court began by noting the general rule that the goal of contract
interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the parties.5 4
However, the court said, "if the language of a policy prepared by an
insurer is ambiguous, obscure, uncertain, or susceptible to more than
one construction, the language must be construed most strongly
against the insurer, and the construction most favorable to the insured
must be adopted."5
The court candidly recognized that these general rules of contract
construction are inherently flexible ones which permit courts a great
deal of discretion in interpreting language in a particular insurance
contract. It stated:
Much argument in this case has been expended on the very issue of ambi-
guity .... It appears to us that the concept of ambiguity, as used in interpreta-
tion of contractual provisions, is a rather relative concept. What may appear
to be clear and precise terminology in the abstract reading of the document
may become rather unclear and imprecise when applied to real factual pat-
terns.... There is an implicit recognition in law that even the most carefully
drafted document and extensively bargained contract will not provide a true
proverbial "meeting of the minds" as to all possible, or even likely, scenarios
of application.56
According to the court in J.H. France, in construing ambiguous
contract language, courts have adopted a "reasonable expectation" ap-
proach to contract interpretation, requiring that the "reasonable ex-
pectation of the parties be, in essence, imputed as the intent of the
parties and, perhaps as important, acquiesced to by the parties to the
51. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus., 514 N.E.2d 150, 159 (1987).
52. Id.
53. 578 A.2d 468 (Pa. Super 1990), appeal granted, J.H. France Refractories Co. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 592 A.2d 1302 (Pa. 1991); Pet. of Pennsylvania Mfr.'s As'n Ins.
Co., 592 A.2d 1303 (Pa. 1991).






contract."57 This test is not, the court cautioned, a "carte blanche ap-
proval of the insured's wildest and most comprehensive expectation.
Rather, it should clearly incorporate an understanding of the general
relationship between the parties, the purpose behind their entering a
contractual relationship and the relative position of each."5 8
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in France, like other courts ex-
amining the question of trigger of coverage in asbestos cases, also be-
lieved that the court should, as a matter of public policy, interpret the
policy to further the goals of the insured.5 9 The court noted that the
language of the CGL policy defined "bodily injury" as not only injury
in fact, but also sickness and disease. The court said:
It is noteworthy that injury is defined (by the policy) as encompassing not
only injury in fact, but also sickness and disease. These terms, given their
general meaning, encompass progressive and/or transitory processes of the
body, more so than a momentary occurrence of injury which produces an im-
mediate physical incapacitation. Since, within the policy, the phrase "injury"
is defined in a rather broad fashion to include disease and sickness... it is not
difficult to conclude, considering only the terminology used, that the policy
encompasses the entire disease process, from exposure to manifestation of
incapacitation.6
0
The J.H. France court concluded that a "continuous" trigger of cov-
erage was appropriate in cases where exposure to a toxic substance
begins a process of injury to the body that develops gradually into sick-
ness and disease. It held that in such cases, an insurer is liable for
bodily injuries to plaintiffs from the date of exposure to asbestos, con-
tinuing through the point in time when the injury or disease manifests
itself.61
57. I&
58. Id- at 473, citing a leading decision in this area of inquiry, Keene Corp. v. Insur-
ance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
59. Id
60. Id at 476-77.
61. In toxic tort cases involving personal injuries resulting from exposure to asbestos,
bodily injury occurs, on a cellular level, almost contemporaneously with exposure
to asbestos fibers. "The evidence establishes that individual cells in the trachea
die within thirty minutes of being invaded by an asbestos fiber." I& at 474. Be-
cause exposure is the ultimate cause of the eventual incapacitation from the ac-
cumulation of discreet injuries on a cellular level, exposure should trigger
coverage under the policy.
The court also noted that "should exposure be found not to trigger coverage,
the insurer would reap an unwarranted windfall. It would be insulated from
bearing the liability protection it was reasonably construed to be offering, and
thus the risk it was assuming, even though it collected premiums for the entire
relevant period." I& at 476. It is also reasonable for an insured to expect that the
purchase of liability insurance would cover liability for incapacity developing and
manifesting itself during a period of time when the policy was in effect. Manifes-
tation is just as relevant as exposure because it focuses on the end result of the
accumulation of cellular injuries.
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B. Triggering Liability in Property Damage Cases
Some courts have relied on asbestos cases like J.H. France in hold-
ing that a "continuous" or "triple" trigger should apply in property
damage cases where industrial defendants are mandated to pay the
costs of cleaning up a contaminated site under CERCLA or are sued
for property damages caused by industrial waste.6 2 Those courts
adopting a continuous trigger suggest that industrial pollution of land
or water, especially in those cases where contamination occurs
through gradual seepage or leakage from a polluted site, is analogous
to the evolution of disease from exposure to toxic substances like
asbestos.63
Not all courts, however, accept the applicability of the continuous
trigger in property damage cases where insureds seek indemnification
for cleanup costs under CERCLA or recovery of damages paid to third
parties as a result of hazardous waste contamination of neighboring
property. Some courts have found that application of a continuous
trigger in property damage cases inappropriate because it is not sup-
ported by the language of the policy itself.64 Other courts note that
there are significant differences between evolution of human disease
as a result of exposure to toxic torts and damage to real property as a
result of hazardous waste contamination. Migration of toxic chemicals
may result in separable injuries to real property, but the nature of the
injury does not "evolve" in the same sense that exposure to asbestos
evolves into disease. Exposure to toxic substances like asbestos begins
an "injury" process eventually resulting in bodily injury that began
with exposure. In property damage cases there is no "progressive" dis-
ease in the sense that exposure causes a disease or sickness to develop,
although damage caused by a spill may progress further as time
passes.65
62. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins., 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 358 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1992)
discussed infra at notes 108-30.
63. Note, The Applicability of General Liability Insurance to Hazardous Waste Dis-
posal, supra note 23, at 758.
64. 'Bodily injury" in the standard CGL policies is defined as "bodily injury, sickness
or disease," thus suggesting that any continuous evolution of bodily disease, as
well as the resulting sickness or disease, should be a triggering event for purposes
of the policy. "Property damage" includes "physical injury to property which oc-
curs during the policy period," suggesting that injury occurs when the contamina-
tion to real property occurs. See J.H. France Refractories v. Allstate Ins. Co., 578
A.2d 468 (Pa. Super. 1990); Armotek Indus. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 952 F.2d
756 (3rd. Cir. 1991).
65. See, e.g., Armotek Industries v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 952 F.2d 756 (3rd Cir.
1991), where the court found
little if any similarity between [an asbestos exposure case] and the pres-
ent case. Persons who suffer from asbestos-related diseases are often ex-
posed to asbestos for some period and generally do not manifest
symptoms until some later point. Here a large spill of chromic acid alleg-
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Courts are more likely to adopt a "continuous trigger" in property
damage cases where damage occurs as a result of a slow and gradual
process, as in cases where leaching from a waste disposal landfill ulti-
mately contaminates neighboring property.66 These cases appear par-
allel to the asbestosis cases, where a disease inflicts progressive bodily
injury.67 But the courts are far from uniform in their determination
of an appropriate trigger in property damage cases. Presently, at least
four different triggers have been adopted by different courts to deter-
mine liability for property damage under a CGL policy. These include
the "exposure" theory, the "injury in fact" theory, the "manifestation
of injury" trigger, and the "continuous trigger" theory. A court's deci-
sion to adopt a particular trigger in a property damage case is gener-
ally based on three considerations: the express language of the policy;
the kind of occurrence resulting in harm-that is, whether the con-
tamination resulted from a sudden event like a "spill" or from gradual
contamination like leakage; and general public policy concerns, in-
cluding a desire to maximize insurance coverage in these cases.
1. The "Exposure" Rule.
Under the exposure rule, liability under a CGL policy is triggered
at the time the property is exposed to a hazardous substance. The ex-
posure rule presumes that property damage occurs simultaneously at
the moment of the release of hazardous substances. Continental In-
surance Companies v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical
Company (NEPACCO)68 is an example of a case where a court im-
posed liability on an insurer under this theory. In that case, Continen-
tal Insurance brought suit against NEPACCO, a chemical producer,
and its former officers and directors, seeking a declaration that it was
under no duty to defend or indemnify NEPACCO for CERCLA and
state cleanup liability or for personal injury and property damage aris-
ing out of disposal of its chemical waste.69
edly occurred in 1977.... Armotek has not pointed to facts that could
establish "exposure in residence," i.e., that the property damage caused
by the spill progressed further during the policies' terms.
Id at 763.
66. New Castle County v. Continental Casualty Co. (CNA), 725 F. Supp. 800 (D. Del.
1989). In this case, a county brought an action against its CGL and excess insurer
for determination of indemnity and costs of defense in suits against the county
arising out of leachate from landfills.
67. Id at 809.
68. 811 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1987), aff'd in par4 rev'd in part, 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.
1988).
69. From 1970 to 1972, the Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Company
(NEPACCO) produced hexachlorophene at a chemical plant in Verona, Missouri.
In July 1971, NEPACCO arranged to dispose of at least eight-five fifty-five gallon
drums of these wastes in a trench on a farm near Verona. (called the "Denny
Farm" site). Subsequently, in 1971-1973, the company arranged for disposal with
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From 1970 to 1972, NEPACCO produced hexachlorophene at a
chemical plant in Verona, Missouri, in a process that produced a vari-
ety of wastes, including dioxin. In 1971, NEPACCO made arrange-
ments to dispose of these wastes at a farm site in Verona, Missouri
(the "Denny farm" site). Later, in 1971 or 1972, NEPACCO hired In-
dependent Petrochemical Corporation (IPC) to dispose of additional
wastes generated at the plant. In 1971, 1972 and 1973, thousands of
gallons of chemical wastes generated by NEPACCO were spread at
Bubbling Springs Stables in Fenton, and on the roads of Times Beach,
Missouri.70 In 1974, twenty truckloads of contaminated dirt from the
stables was used as landfill at another site (called the "Minker/Stout/
Romaine Creek" site.)7 '
In 1980, the EPA cleaned up the Denny farm site and sought to
recover its costs through a lawsuit against NEPACCO and others. In
1983, a number of former residents of Times Beach and Imperial, Mis-
souri, sought recovery for personal injuries and property damage from
NEPACCO caused by the dumping of wastes in and around Times
Beach (the "Capstick" suit). During the two-year period from 1970 to
1972 that NEPACCO was in business, it was insured under compre-
hensive general liability policies issued by Continental.72 Continental
maintained that it was under no duty to defend or indemnify
NEPACCO for liability arising out of the EPA suit or the suit by
Times Beach plaintiffs because costs sought by the government were
not "property damage" as defined by the policies, and because the
cleanup action was instituted after the effective date of the policies.7 3
The district court granted Continental's motion for summary judg-
ment on the basis that cleanup costs sought by the EPA and the state
were not "property damage" as defined by the CGL policies, and that
"no damages were incurred by the government entities during the pol-
icies' effective dates." 74 The State of Missouri, which had intervened
a party who ultimately spread thousands of gallons of these wastes at Bubbling
Springs Stables in Fenton and on the roads of Times Beach, Missouri. Continen-
tal Ins. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 811 F.2d 1180, 1182 (8th Cir. 1987).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Three somewhat different policies were in effect from August 5, 1970, to August
5,1971; August 5, 1971 to August 5, 1972; and August 5, 1972 to November 5, 1972.
Each policy required Continental to: "pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of A.
bodily injury or B. property damage to which this insurance applied caused by an
occurrence."
Id. at 1182-83.
73. Id. at 1184.
74. Id- The Court also granted Continental's motion to dismiss without prejudice
Count H of its complaint (by Times Beach residents), stating that "more specific
findings of bodily injury and property damage" were needed first. Id.
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to protect its interests arising out of claims against NEPACCO (the
"IPC" suit) appealed.
On appeal, a panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
with the state that the CGL policy language, the common meaning of
"property damage," and section 107 of CERCLA all supported the gov-
ernment's position that cleanup costs under CERCLA are compensa-
tory as "property damage" within the meaning of the CGL policies. 75
The court then addressed the issue of whether the government suf-
fered an "occurrence" of property damage during the policy period be-
cause, although the improper waste disposal occurred during the
policy period, the cleanup costs were not incurred until long after the
policies expired.
The court said that the "majority view" is that environmental dam-
age occurs at the moment that hazardous wastes are improperly re-
leased into the environment, and that a liability policy in effect at the
time this damage is caused provides coverage for the subsequently in-
curred costs of cleaning up the wastes. 76 Under this view, improper
disposal of hazardous wastes during a policy period constitutes an "oc-
currence" of "property damage" at the time of release into the envi-
ronment. 77 The court said that the decisions supporting the exposure
trigger are similar to those involving insurance coverage for progres-
sive diseases where exposure to a harmful substance occurs during the
policy period but the disease or illness develops later after the policy
expired. The court stated: "These decisions rest on the view that ex-
posure to the dangerous substance at issue during the policy period
caused immediate, albeit undetectable, physical harm which ulti-
mately led to disease or physical impairment after the policy pe-
riod."78 The court also justified the "exposure" trigger in CERCLA
cleanup cases by noting "exposure" as a triggering event is consistent
with the language of CERCLA itself, which imposes liability when-
ever there is a "release, or threatened release which causes the incur-
rence of response costs." 79
Applying the exposure theory in this case, the court found that
"property damage" first occurred in July 1971, when improper dispo-
75. Id at 1189. On rehearing en banc, the 8th Circuit held that the term "damages"
as used in standard general liability insurance policy form did not include cleanup
costs under CERCLA or RCRA; however, it agreed with the panel decision that
Missouri would probably adopt the "exposure" theory of coverage in this case.
842 F.2d 977, 984 (8th Cir. 1988).




79. "'[R]elease' means any spilling leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environ-
ment." Id at n. 23, 1189.
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sal of hazardous wastes (the wrongful act), the release of hazardous
wastes into the environment (exposure), and the contamination of the
environment (injury-in-fact) happened virtually simultaneously.8 0
Because exposure occurred during the period of time when the first
insurance policy issued by Continental to NEPACCO was in effect,
the court held that Continental could be liable for dumping of wastes
at the Denny Farm site which first began in July 1971; however, the
court said that Continental was not liable to defend or indemnify
NEPACCO for liability arising from the IPC suit, in which the state
sought to recover the costs of cleaning up the Minker/Stout/Romaine
Creek site, because the contaminated dirt was not used as landfill at
the site until 1974, and thus exposure and injury in fact occurred after
the CGL policies had expired.Sl
Although the Court in Continental Ins. v. NEPACCO adopted an
"exposure" trigger for determining application of a CGL policy in this
case, it also suggested that a continuous trigger theory might have
merit in situations where it is impossible to determine the point in
time when an improper release occurred.82 However, in property
damage cases where crucial events-release of hazardous wastes into
the environment and subsequent property damage-occur virtually si-
multaneously, the "exposure theory" is most appropriate according to
the court.8 3 The exposure theory is based on the assumption that in-
jury occurs at the point of exposure. In cases like Continental Insur-
ance v. NEPACCO, where improper disposal of hazardous wastes
immediately results in release into the environment, this trigger is jus-
tified. Hazardous wastes are by definition harmful, and exposure and
injury in fact occur simultaneously in such cases.8 4 In cases where dis-
posal of hazardous wastes into the environment causes the release of
hazardous wastes at some point in the future, however, the exposure
theory may not accurately reflect the moment in time when injury
occurs. For this reason, some courts have adopted an "injury in fact"
80. Id at 1191.
81. Id. at 1192. The court agreed with the trial court that additional fact finding and
analysis was necessary for resolution of the insurance coverage issues in the Cap-
stick suit, involving claims by private individuals for personal and property dam-
age. Id On rehearing en banc, the 8th Circuit agreed that Missouri would
probably adopt an "exposure" theory in this case. 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988).
82. Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 811 F.2d 1180,1192 (8th Cir.
1987), n. 29. The court continued, "In this situation, it may be reasonable to view
the time of occurrence as the time the accident or release is first discovered. We
are not faced with such a situation here, however, and we are not persuaded that
the continuous trigger theory has merit in a cleanup cost recovery case such as
this one where the date of the first property damage occurrence is clear and
where the cleanup efforts have been pinpointed at the site of this damage." Id. at
1192.
83. McMillan, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id at 1193.
84. Id. at 1191.
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trigger, which triggers insurer liability at point in time when the dam-
age to property actually occurred.
2. The "Injury in Fact" Trigger
Under the express language of an occurrence policy, liability arises
when injury to the property or person occurs. As a result, some courts
have adopted "injury in fact" as the event which triggers a duty to
defend or indemnify under a CGL insurance policy.85 In a 1990 deci-
sion, Detrex Chemical Industries v. Employers Ins,8 6 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that under Mich-
igan law, "injury in fact" triggered the insurer's duty to defend a
cleanup action against the insured under a CGL policy.
In Detrex, the insured, Detrex Chemical, brought an action against
Employer's Insurance of Wausau, Detrex's general comprehensive lia-
bility insurer, to determine the insurer's duty to defend and indemnify
Detrex in connection with an action by the EPA regarding the dis-
charge of pollutants of chemical solvents at the plant site.8 7 After its
motion for summary judgment was denied, Detrex moved for recon-
sideration. On reconsideration, the district court addressed, among
other issues, the question of the appropriate trigger of coverage under
the terms of the CGL policy.ss
The CGL policies at issue in the case contained standard policy lan-
guage defining "occurrence."89 The insured, Detrex, urged the court
to define "occurrence" in a way that imposed a "continuous trigger" of
liability under the terms of the policy, arguing that at least part of the
continuing damage process at the plant site occurred during the policy
period.9 0 Detrex maintained that the continuous trigger was applica-
85. There is a difference between "duty to defend" and "duty to indemnify." The
duty to defend an insured under the policy is broader than the duty to indemnify.
Garriott Crop Dusting v. Superior Court, 270 Cal. Rptr. 678 (Cal. App. 5 Dist.
1990).
86. 746 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D.Ohio 1990)
87. I- at 1311.
88. Id at 1319. The District Court found, among other things, that issuance of a PRP
letter by the EPA did not give rise to a duty to defend by the insurer, that in
order to avoid the pollution exclusion within the policy, the insured was required
to show that the release of pollutants was sudden and accidental in that it hap-
pened quickly and without warning, and that the Michigan courts would apply an
injury in fact trigger rather than a continuous damage coverage trigger.
89. "Occurrence" was defined in the 1967-1972 policies as "An accident, including in-
jurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in bodily
injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of
the insured." Id-
90. "Thus, as a matter of law, coverage under Wausau's standard policy language has
been triggered. Moreover, each triggered policy is liable for Detrex's entire liabil-
ity in an Environmental Action, and Detrex may select, from among those trig-
gered, the policy that will respond to a particular Environmental Action." Id-
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ble in this case because "the occurrence is the cause of the damage,
and coverage is triggered by the result during the policy period, not
the cause." The insurer Wausau, however, repudiated the "continuous
trigger theory," arguing that this theory had only been adopted in re-
sult-oriented asbestos bodily injury coverage cases, and that injury in
fact, rather than any artificial trigger theory, should determine which
policies were triggered.91
After reviewing a number of cases where courts had adopted dif-
ferent theories under which coverage is triggered, the Detrex court
concluded that if faced with the question, the Michigan Supreme
Court would adopt "an injury in fact trigger" of coverage in this case.92
Under this theory, an actual injury must occur during the time the
policy is in effect in order to be indemnfiable.9 3 The injury in fact
rule is based on the conclusion that the "occurrence" clause in the
standard CGL policy is not ambiguous, and the "plain meaning" of the
term is clear: "It is (1) an accident (2) which results (3) in property
damage (4) during the policy period."9 4 The Detrex court cited, with
approval, the following statement from a previous case rejecting ambi-
guity in the language of the CGL policy:
The plain language of the definition of "occurrence" used in the CGL policy
requires exposure that 'results, during the policy period, in bodily injury' in
order for an insurer to be obligated to indemnify the insured. The unambigu-
ous meaning of these words is that an injury--and not mere exposure-must
result during the policy period. The CGL policies expressly distinguish expo-
sure from injury; to equate the two as urged by Abex is to ignore this distinc-
tion. Any argument that mere exposure-without injury-triggers liability is
simply unsound linguistically .... 95
The Detrex decision is based on the plain meaning of the language
of the standard CGL policy, and the policy language clearly justifies
adoption of an "injury in fact" trigger in hazardous waste coverage
disputes involving damage to real property.96 Although the "injury in
91. Id. at 1320.
92. The court cited American Home Prod. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), affirmed as modified, 748 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1984), Triangle Publi-
cations, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 703 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Pa. 1989), in holding
that Michigan would adopt the injury in fact trigger of coverage. Detrex Chem.
Indus. v. Employers Ins., 746 F. Supp. 1310, 1324-25 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
93. Detrex Chem. Indus. v. Employers Ins., 746 F. Supp. 1310, 1323 (N.D. Ohio
1990)(citing Triangle Publications, Inc., v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 703 F. Supp. 367
(E.D. Pa. 1989)).
94. In support of its adoption of the "injury in fact" trigger, the Detrex court cited
with approval an earlier D.C. Circuit court's decision in Abex Corp. v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 790 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In Abex, the D.C. Circuit rejected
application of the "continuous trigger" in an asbestos case, holding that an in-
surer's obligation to indemnify arises when the asbestos causes real bodily injury
during the policy period. I&i at 1342.
95. Detrex Chem. Indus. v. Employers Ins., 746 F. Supp. 1310, 1322-23 (N.D. Ohio
1990)(emphasis in original).
96. See also Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 703 F. Supp. 367, 370
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fact" rule is justified by the policy language, however, it is often very
difficult to determine as a factual matter when the "injury" occurred,
especially in property damage cases where the damage results from a
slow, gradual process like underground seepage of hazardous sub-
stances. In some cases, it may be reasonable to equate injury with ex-
posure. In other cases, it may be difficult if not impossible to
determine when the first molecule of contaminant damaged neighbor-
ing property.97 Consequently, in some cases, courts that have adopted
the injury in fact trigger in a continuous injury context have had to
abandon a precise determination of when injury in fact occurred be-
cause of these evidentiary problems.98 Other courts have adopted a
third kind of trigger-the "manifestation of injury" rule, which pro-
vides that for purposes of CGL liability coverage, the occurrence is
deemed to take place when the injuries first manifest themselves.99
3. The "Manifestation of Injury" Trigger
The manifestation rule provides a clear focal point for triggering
coverage under a CGL policy because coverage is triggered at the time
that personal injury or property damage becomes apparent or known
to the victim or property owner.10 0 Under the manifestation rule, ac-
tual damage is equated with the moment in time the injury manifested
itself, or should have been apparent to the complaining party, rather
than the time the wrongful act was committed.lol
The manifestation rule attempts to address situations where a
wrongful act such as a release of toxic chemicals through seepage into
groundwater produces no harm for some time, but then suddenly
manifests itself in some dramatic fashion. In these situations, damage
remains concealed for some time before the injury becomes apparent,
and determining when that damage first occurred may be impossible.
In a 1986 case, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a
"manifestation of injury" rule in a case involving burial of hazardous
waste. In Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., Ltd., the court held
that the complaint in a CERCLA cleanup action against a chemical
(E.D. Pa. 1989), (holding that "the plain language of the CGL contract supports
only one construction: the injury-in-fact analysis."). Id. at 370.
97. Detrex Chem. Indus. v. Employers Ins., 746 F. Supp. 1310, 1322-23 (N.D. Ohio
1990).
98. New Castle County v. Continental Casualty Co., 725 F. Supp. 800 (D. Del.
1989)(New Castle III).
99. See, e.g., Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F. 2d 56, 62 (3d Cir.
1982); Bartholomew v. Appalachian Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 27, 28 (Ist Cir. 1981)(when
the defect takes place or is discovered); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. PPG Indus.,
Inc. 554 F. Supp. 290, 294 (D. Ariz. 1983).
100. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110, (D.
Mass. 1981), modified, 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982).
101. Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986).
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company did not allege an "occurrence" within the meaning of the
CGL policy because in such cases, "occurrence" is judged by the time
at which injuries first manifested themselves (that is, when leakage
and damage are first discovered), and the leakage of hazardous waste
in this case had not been discovered during the effective dates of the
policy.1 0 2
In Mraz, a CERCLA cleanup action had been filed against Paul and
Sally Mraz, who controlled Galaxy Chemicals, Inc., to recover the
costs of removing hazardous wastes buried by the company in 1969.
The Mrazes then brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment
that Galaxy's former insurer, Canadian Universal Insurance, had a
duty to defend and indemnify them in the cleanup action. The trial
court held that Canadian Universal had a duty to defend the plain-
tiffs,103 but on appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed. The court said
that in situations where the existence or scope of damage remains con-
cealed or uncertain for a period time even though damage is occurring,
the better rule is that the occurrence is deemed to take place when the
injuries first manifest themselves.10 4 Applying the "manifestation
rule" in this case, the Fourth Circuit held that there was no "occur-
rence" for purposes of the CGL policy because nothing in the com-
plaint against the Mrazes indicated that the release was discovered
any earlier than 1981, over eleven years after Canadian Universal (the
insurer) had ceased coverage.105
The manifestation rule has been justified in other property damage
cases where it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the point in
time when damage began.10 6 However, an interpretation of the "oc-
currence" language of the CGL policy that triggers liability under a
manifestation rule, holding that property damage doesn't occur until
102. Id. at 1328.
103. Mraz v. American Universal Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1173 (D.C. Md. 1985), rev'd, 804
F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986).
104. Mraz v. American Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986), (citing Appa-
lachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1982); Bartholomew
v. Appalachian Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 27, (1st Cir. 1981); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
PPG Industries, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 290 (D. Ariz. 1983)). The Mraz court said, "The
general rule is that the time of the occurrence of an accident within the meaning
of an indemnity policy is not the time the wrongful act was committed but the
time when the complaining party was actually damaged. Often these cases in-
volve a wrongful act that produces no harm for a period of time and then sud-
denly manifests itself in a burst of damage." Id.
105. Id.
106. Other cases adopting a manifestation of injury trigger include Peerless Ins. Co. v.
Strother, 765 F. Supp. 866 (E.D.N.C. 1990); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Levelor
Lorentzen, Inc., No. 88-1994, 1988 WL 112142 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988), appeal dis-
missed, 879 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, No. 88-1194 (D.N.J.
June 27, 1990), aff'd, 932 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1991).; Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lumber-
mes Mut. Casualty Co., 677 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Armotek Indus. v. Em-
ployers Ins., 952 F.2d 756 (3d Cir. 1991).
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the owner knows of the injury, contradicts the actual language of the
policy. The policy language mandates coverage when injury or dam-
age occurs, not when it becomes apparent. Inserting an element of
knowledge of the occurrence into the definition of occurrence in a
CGL policy makes it simpler to identify the point in time when cover-
age is triggered, but the standard policy language makes no reference
to an insured's actual knowledge of the occurrence as a requirement of
triggering coverage under the policy. The manifestation rule not
only appears to contradict the language of the insurance agreement, it
may also be bad public policy. In some cases, under a manifestation of
injury rule, insurers could avoid liability by refusing to write new poli-
cies if they suspect a flood of claims might be approaching. 107 For
these reasons, an "injury in fact" trigger is the better rule because it
best reflects the intention of the parties as expressed in the language
of the agreement.
The injury in fact rule and the exposure rule limit insurer liability
in some cases because it excludes insurer liability under CGL policies
in effect after exposure or actual release of hazardous substances oc-
curred. The manifestation rule limits insurer liability in some cases
because it excludes liability under policies in effect prior to the time
the contamination manifested itself. Recognition of the evidentiary
problems inherent in these coverage triggers, as well as an assumption
that maximizing insurer liability is in the public interest, has led some
courts to extend liability of insurers in property damage cases from
the point of exposure through the actual "manifestation of injury"
under a fourth trigger, the continuous or multiple trigger rule.
4. Applying a Continuous Trigger in Property Damage Cases:
Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Insurance
Under a continuous trigger in property damage cases, liability is
imposed on insurers under any policy in effect when exposure to con-
tamination occurred, actual damage to the property occurred, or prop-
erty damage actually became manifest. Multiple insurers may thus
find themselves liable for cleanup of a particular site, and in some
states may be jointly and severally liable for the costs of cleanup.10 8 In
1992 the California Court of Appeals became one of the first courts in
the nation to adopt a "continuous trigger" of insurer liability in a pol-
lution cleanup case, Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Insur-
ance. 0 9 In that case, the California court held that bodily injuries and
property damage which are continuous and progressive throughout
107. Note, Developments-Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 11, at 1580.
108. This assumes that policy exclusions are not effective. New Jersey, for example,
imposes joint and several liability on multiple insurers. Mack, supra note 23, at
496.
109. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1992), petition for rev. granted May 21, 1992.
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successive policy periods are covered by all policies in effect during
those periods.10 In finding that the insurer, Admiral, was obligated to
defend Montrose in those actions, the California Court of Appeals
adopted a rule which will have a substantial impact on the insurance
industry as a whole.",1 Under the court's decision in Montrose, any
insurer who issued a comprehensive liability policy to a policy-holder
may be obligated to defend and indemnify the insured if the policy was
in effect at some time between the moment pollution first began until
the contamination became known and the cleanup action instituted.
In Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Ins., Montrose Chemical
Corporation sought a declaration obligating Admiral Insurance Com-
pany, its insurer under four comprehensive general liability policies,
to defend Montrose in lawsuits seeking damages for personal injuries
and property damage allegedly caused by Montrose's disposal of haz-
ardous wastes at times predating the inception of Admiral's policies.
Montrose, a defunct chemical company, had manufactured DDT for
use in pesticides from 1947 until 1982, and since 1960 had been covered
by CGL insurance policies purchased from seven different carriers."12
Five actions were pending against Montrose at the time of Mont-
rose's action against Admiral. All alleged property damage and one
alleged bodily injuries resulting from the contamination of sites where
Montrose manufactured its product or disposed of its hazardous
waste.113 The sites involved in the various actions against Montrose
110. The trial court had granted summary judgment in favor of Admiral; on appeal,
the Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment granted in favor of Admiral.
Id. at 360.
111. In addition to the parties' briefs, Mid-America Legal Foundation filed an amicus
brief in support of Montrose; Atlantic Richfield Corporation, NEC Electronics,
Inc., Martin Marietta Corporation, Northrop Corporation, Syntext (USA), Inc.
and Univar Corporation filed a joint amicus brief supporting Montrose. Pacific
Indemnity Company and Continental Casualty Company both supported Admi-
ral, and the Travelers Indemnity Company filed an amicus brief supporting Ad-
miral, urging adoption of the "manifestation of loss" rule in property damage
cases. American Motorists Insurance Company filed an amicus brief urging
adoption of an "actual discovery" trigger. Finally, Insurance Environmental Liti-
gation Association and Ayliffe and Companies filed two amicus briefs supporting
Admiral, addressing the "known loss" rule. Id at 363, n.7. This case is presently
on appeal to the California Supreme Court.
112. Policies issued by Admiral included four separate CGL policies, covering the pe-
riod from October 13, 1982, to March 20, 1986. Id at 360. The policies contained
standard CGL language. Admiral's policies obligated it to "pay on behalf of
[Montrose] all sums which [Montrose] shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of... bodily injury, or... property damage to which this insur-
ance applies, caused by an occurrence." Id "Occurrence" was defined as "an ac-
cident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in
bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the stand-
point of [Montrose]. Id. There were six other insurance carriers involved in the
litigation, none of which were parties to the appeal. See Id at n.1.
113. Id. at 360. These included an action wherein the United States sought reimburse-
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included the Stringfellow site, where chemical wastes generated by
Montrose were deposited between 1968 and 1972, and the Parr-Rich-
mond Terminal site, where all chemical processing had ceased in 1964
or 1965 and environmental contamination had manifested itself no
later than August 1982.114
In determining whether it was obligated to defend and indemnify
Montrose under the terms of its four CGL policies, Admiral urged the
court to apply a "manifestation of loss" rule, which would trigger lia-
bility under the policies at the point when Montrose discovered (or
should have discovered) the problem at the Stringfellow site.115 This
rule would have effectively limited Admiral's liability to Montrose to
damages that became apparent between October 13, 1982 and March
20, 1986, the coverage periods of the four CGL policies issued by Admi-
ral.116 Under a "manifestation of loss" coverage trigger, policies com-
mencing after manifestation or discovery of contamination would
afford no coverage, even though the injury or damage continued into
the effective period of the post-discovery policy.11 7
Montrose urged the court to adopt the "continuous injury" trigger
because this trigger would afford it the greatest coverage under terms
of preexisting CGL policies."-8 The court defined the "continuous trig-
ger" as follows: "Under the 'continuing injury' analysis, the timing of
the cause of the bodily injury or property damage (the insured's negli-
gent act) is immaterial (it doesn't matter if it was before or during the
policy period), as is the date of discovery of the injury or damage
ment for CERCLA costs in investigating, removing and remediating contamina-
tion at and near the Stringfellow Acid Pits in Riverside County; a private party
toxic tort action for damages for personal injuries and property damage beginning
in 1956 and continuing to the present time at or near the Stringfellow cite; and
three actions brought by Levin Metals against Parr-Richmond, alleging that real
property sold by Parr-Richmond to Levin Metals in 1981 was contaminated with
hazardous waste (Parr-Richmond cross-complained against Montrose and others
for contributions and indemnity for allegedly contaminating the United Hecka-
thorn site in Contra Costa County during a period from 1947 to the present). Id.
at 360-61.
114. Id. at 361-62.
115. Id. at 362. Admiral relied on this rule which had been articulated by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in a first-party insurance case, Prudential-LMI Commercial
Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal. 1990).
116. Admiral also argued the "known risk rule," that is, that the risks for which Mont-
rose now sought coverage were known to it at the time the policies were
purchased, and that coverage was barred under the "known loss" doctrine. Mont-
rose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins., 5 Cal. Rptr. 358, 362 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1992).
Under the California insurance code, an insurance contract is an agreement to
indemnify against loss, damage or liability "arising form a contingent or unknown
event." Id. Admiral also argued that an "occurrence" under the policy is an acci-
dent resulting in injury or damage neither expected nor intended by the insured.
Id.
117. Id. at 365.
118. Id. at 364.
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(which may not be contemporaneous), and it is only the effect ...
which matters."1 19
The court then examined the standardized language of the CGL
insurance contracts involved in the dispute, noting that the construc-
tion of the standard policy language defining "occurrence" by courts in
various states has been inconsistent and has resulted in a "bewildering
plethora of authority... as a result of the increasing number of toxic
tort cases." 2 0 The court next distinguished first and third party in-
surance policies, noting that the interpretation of "occurrence" may
differ depending on whether the policy provides coverage for loss or
damage sustained by the insured (a "first party" policy) or coverage
for liability of the insured to another (a "third party" policy) as in this
case.12 1
The California Supreme Court previously had applied the "mani-
festation of loss" rule in a case involving a "first party" insurance con-
tract.122 In Montrose, the California appellate court declined to apply
the manifestation rule in the third party context, and instead adopted
the "continuous injury" trigger. The Montrose court based its decision
to impose maximum liability on the insurer on a finding that the term
"occurrence" is ambiguous, and by relying on the rule that ambiguity
or uncertainty should be resolved against the insurer and, if semanti-
cally permissible, the policy construed in favor of coverage to protect
the "objectively reasonable expectations of the insured". 123
According to the court, it was reasonable for Montrose to expect
coverage and a defense for continuous and progressive bodily injuries
and property damage under more than one policy in this case. 12 4 The
court said that the distinction between "claims made" and "occur-
rence" policies supported Montrose's position that a continuous trig-
119. Id
120. Id at 363 (citing Gottlieb v. Newark Ins. Co., 238 N.J. Super. 531,570 A.2d 443,445
(1990)).
121. I. at 363, n.9. According to the court, coverage may also differ depending on
whether the issue concerns bodily injury or property damage or both, or whether
the event is a single event resulting in immediate injury (like an explosion), a
single event resulting in continuing injury (such as a chemical spill) or a continu-
ing event resulting in single or multiple injuries (exposure to asbestos). Id at 364.
122. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal. 1990).
However, the Montrose court distinguished third party policies from first party
policies, noting that there is no "inception of the loss" in the former, and no rea-
son for an insured to expect a discovery limitation to be read into a third party
policy. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins., 5 Cal. Rptr. 358, 367 (Cal. App. 2
Dist. 1992). Id. at 367.
123. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins., 5 Cal. Rptr. 358, 365 (Cal. App. 2 Dist.
1992). Because the policies in question here are 'comprehensive,' it was within
the insured's reasonable expectation that new types of statutory liability would
be covered, as long as they were within the ambit of the language used in the
coverage provision. Id. at 366.
124. I
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ger was appropriate in this case. Under a "claims made" policy, the
claim must be asserted during a precise period identified by dates
within the policy.125 The court agreed with Montrose that application
of a "manifestation of loss" rule to a CGL "occurrence" policy in this
case would transform its "occurrence" policy into a "claims made"
policy.126
In adopting a continuous trigger, the Montrose court also relied on
the change in the standard CGL policy in 1966 from an "accident-
based" to an "occurrence-based" format, suggesting that by 1966 the
insurance industry knew about the potential coverage issues concern-
ing long-term, delayed-manifestation injuries caused by pollutants. 2 7
The court found that drafters of the "occurrence" policy and experts
advising the industry regarding its interpretation contemplated cover-
age under successive policies for progressive continuing injuries and
damage as in this case. 12 8
Applying a "continuous injury" rule in this case, the court found
that Admiral's policies had been triggered by both the Stringfellow
Cases and the Levin Metals Cases-in the former because property
damage and personal injuries began in 1956 and continued to the pres-
ent, and the latter because property damage occurred beginning in
1947 and continued to the present.1 2 9
The decision by the California Court of Appeals in Montrose has
been hailed as a "major victory for policyholders," one which means
billions of dollars in coverage to policy holders nationwide because it
allows policyholders access to earlier policies, many of which contain
125. According to the court,
Beginning in about 1986, liability insurers attempted to expand dramati-
cally the use of 'claims made' policies to risks beyond the professional
liability areas in which such coverage came into extensive use in the
1970s. Corporate purchasers did not respond with enthusiasm-they rec-
ognized the increased cost of additional coverage to protect against risks
from long-term future occurrences.
Id. at 367 (citations omitted).
126. A "claims made" policy limits a carrier's risk by restricting coverage to the single
policy in effect at the time a claim is asierted, thus permitting the carrier to es-
tablish reserves without regard to possibilities of inflation, upward-spiraling jury
awards or enlargements of tort liability after the policy period. Id
127. The court believed the "drafters of the 'occurrence' policy and experts advising
the industry regarding its interpretation contemplated coverage under successive
policies for progressive continuing injuries and damage." Id. at 369.
128. Id.
129. See supra note 113. The court also rejected the "known loss" argument. Admiral
had contended there was no coverage under this rule, and thus no duty to defend,
the Stringfellow cases. Under this rule, when a loss is "known or apparent"
before a policy of insurance is issued, there is no coverage. Id at 370 (citations
omitted). The court said that where an insured is under no legal obligation to pay
and no lawsuits were filed at the time the policies were purchased, there is an
insurable risk within the meaning of the insurance code. Id. at 371.
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no aggregate limits and no pollution exclusion.130 Insurers, on the
other hand, have lamented the court's decision, arguing that it is un-
fair to force an insurer to provide coverage under policies issued long
after the damage has become manifest.131
While the Montrose decision may not "single-handedly cause the
demise of the insurance industry," as some have warned,13 2 it is clear
that application of a "continuous injury" trigger in this case exposes
the insurance industry to substantial liability for environmental
cleanup actions under the terms of a comprehensive general liability
insurance policy. The court's decision to adopt the "continuous in-
jury" trigger in Montrose was based on a policy decision to interpret
"ambiguous language" broadly to maximize coverage. 133 Believing it
to be reasonable for Montrose to expect coverage for continuous and
progressive bodily injuries and property damage under more than one
policy, the court said it would apply equitable considerations to spread
the cost among the several policies and insurers. 3 4
Clearly there are important environmental policy considerations
underlying the court's decision in Montrose. The contaminated sites
in Montrose involve some of the most polluted sites in the nation, 3 5
and the insured, Montrose, was a defunct company that presumably
lacked funds to contribute to the costs of cleaning the contaminated
sites.'36 By adopting a "continuous trigger" in Montrose, the court
substantially expanded the funds available for cleanup of the contami-
nated sites in that case by making all insurers who issued CGL policies
to the defendants in that action potentially liable for sharing the clean
up costs at the site.
It is difficult, however, to reconcile the application of a "continuous
trigger" in a property damage case with the plain meaning of "occur-
rence" in the standard CGL policy. Unlike "continuing bodily injury"
cases like the asbestosis cases, the contamination of real property and
the resulting property damage involve a series of discreet and separate
"injuries" to real property rather than the evolution or development
of human disease or sickness. Under the language of the standard
130. Gordon, supra note 23, at 1.
131. Insurers also criticize the court's ruling on the known loss doctrine, suggesting
that there is not enough risk or gamble once a policy holder receives a PRP letter.
A loss, to be insurable, must be a contingent risk." Id at 77.
132. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 368 (Cal. App. 2 Dist.
1992).
133. Id. at 365.
134. Id. at 366.
135. Stringfellow waste site near Riverside, California, is one of the nation's most pol-
luted areas, with cleanup costs estimated at more than $750 million. Gordon,
supra note 23, at 77.
136. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins., 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 358, 360 (Cal.App.2 Dist.
1992). Montrose was one of several hundred potentially responsible parties for
the cleanup of the site. Gordon, supra note 23, at 1.
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CGL policy, the term "bodily injury" includes "sickness" and "dis-
ease," supporting an interpretation that liability is continuously trig-
gered under the policy during the period of time a disease evolves in
the body.3 7 The term "property damage," which is not defined in the
standard policy, contains no suggestion of evolving or developing in-
jury. In fact, the concept of "disease" finds no true analogy in real
property cases because land and water do not develop an illness as a
result of contamination. Rather, pollution inflicts damage upon the
environment, and that damage may occur suddenly, or through a slow
and gradual process. The fact that it may be difficult to pinpoint with
precision the time the injury in fact occurred does not justify imposing
liability on an insurer because contamination continued to exist dur-
ing successive policy periods.
From a policy perspective, the court's decision to adopt a rule that
imposes liability on any insurer who issued a CGL policy at any time
between exposure or release of hazardous waste and manifestation or
discovery of damage, may have the effect of diminishing the availabil-
ity of environmental liability insurance coverage in the future by in-
creasing the uncertainty, and consequently the risk, of environmental
liability to insurers under these policies. It is possible that imposing a
continuous trigger on insurers in cases like Montrose may actually de-
lay response and remedial cleanup actions in the future because the
decision is certain to encourage more insurer/insured litigation by in-
creasing the number of potentially liable insurers in these cases and
by expanding the potential number of litigants involved in multiple-
party site cleanup actions.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: EFFECTUATING
POLICY THROUGH STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
In establishing an appropriate trigger of coverage under a CGL pol-
icy in an environmental coverage dispute, courts generally begin by
applying traditional rules of contract interpretation in order to con-
strue the language of the policy. A primary goal of contract interpre-
tation is to effectuate the intent of the contracting parties.138 If the
language of the policy is clear, leaving no doubt about the extent of
coverage, then intent is determined by the language of the policy. Ref-
erence to the language is both the beginning and the end of analysis,
without regard to the insured's expectations or any other considera-
tion. 3 9 If, however, the contract language is ambiguous, obscure, un-
certain or susceptible to more than one interpretation, the courts
137. See J.H. France Refractories v. Allstate, 578 A.2d 468 (Pa. Super. 1990), discussed
supra at notes 53-61.
138. Id.




resolve ambiguity by construing the contract against the drafter of the
contract-the insurer.140
The fact that courts have developed at least four different "trigger-
ing tests" under the same standard "occurrence" language in the CGL
policy demonstrates that even the most carefully drafted documents
may lack clarity because language is not precise and words are often
susceptible to more than one meaning.141 Ambiguity in a CGL policy
is heightened when circumstances arise that are not specifically ad-
dressed by the writing, as, for example, when an "occurrence" results
from a slow process like leakage of hazardous chemicals from one site
to another.142
If a court finds ambiguity within a standardized contract like a
CGL policy, the court construes the agreement to protect the "objec-
tively reasonable expectation of the insured."143 This "reasonable ex-
pectation" is then imputed to the parties as their actual intent.144 The
rule of reasonable interpretation, thus, does not necessarily result in
an interpretation actually intended by the parties. Rather, it is a de-
vice through which courts implement public policy.145 In recent cases
interpreting the meaning of CGL policy language in modem environ-
mental pollution and toxic tort cases, there has been a clear trend to-
ward maximizing insurance coverage.146 The judicial decision to shift
CERCLA costs to insurers by interpreting provisions of the standard
CGL policy in a way that will maximize coverage is exemplified by
imposition of a "continuous trigger" in actions brought to recover
damages or costs of cleaning up a contaminated site.
140. J.H. France Refractories v. Allstate Ins. Co., 578 A.2d 468 (Pa. Super. 1990).
141. Cases in which courts have struggled to define the words "sudden and acciden-
tal," for example, within the standard pollution exclusion clause, demonstrates
the conflicting opinions about whether "sudden" includes a temporal element, or
is synonymous with "unintended" or "unexpected." See generally, Ballard and
Manus, supra note 23.
142. In addition, gradual polluting leaks usually require the courts to interpret the
"pollution exclusion" clause because most CGL forms exempt the insurer from
coverage unless the event is "sudden or accidental." See Ballard and Manus,
supra note 23.
143. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 366 (Cal. App. 2 Dist.
1992).
144. J.H. France Refractories v. Allstate Ins. Co., 578 A.2d 468 (Pa. Super. 1990).
145. Contract interpretation is a matter of state law, and interpretation of the same
contract language in the CGL policy has differed from state to state based on
courts' different applications of the same principles of statutory interpretation
and interpretation of general public policy rationales underlying those principles.
Many CGL policies have no choice of law provisions. Because of the diversity of
judicial opinions among the states on environmental coverage issues, determina-
tion of which law applies may be critical to the outcome of a particular contro-
versy. See, eg., Detrex Chem. Indus. v. Employers Ins., 746 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D.
Ohio 1990)(applying Michigan law under Ohio choice of law rules).
146. Note, Developments--Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 11, at 1578.
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However, imposition of a "continuous trigger" may actually frus-
trate the ultimate public policy goal of cleaning up contaminated sites.
Courts adopting this trigger expose multiple insurers to the threat of
increased liability. Any policy issuer during the period of time from
actual release to manifestation of property damage may be liable for
the costs of site cleanup under CERCLA or state environmental laws.
The uncertainty of insurer liability under present case law, the often
substantial costs of cleanup, and the strict, joint and several liability
provisions of CERCLA, combine to encourage complicated environ-
mental litigation between multiple parties.
The insurance industry is an industry built on risk assessment.
Until insurers can better identify and predict their potential liability
for environmental damages under the CGL policy, expensive litigation
over the scope of liability under the CGL policies is sure to continue.
Litigation that further delays cleanup actions at seriously contami-
nated sites and which consumes substantial funds that could be allo-
cated to actual cleanup will continue as well. Until environmental
liability costs become more predictable, litigation and the cost of insur-
ance premiums will likely increase. 147 As a result of uncertainty, in-
surers are now drafting even stricter pollution clauses or refusing to
issue any environmental liability policies at all.1 48 Ultimately, indus-
tries may be unable to obtain liability insurance for activities that may
147. Note, Developments-Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 11, at 1576.
148. One result of the desire for certainty is the evolution of the "complete pollution
exclusion clause." Because of rulings by the courts that the sudden and acciden-
tal pollution exclusion is ambiguous, the industry adopted what has come to be
called the "absolute" pollution exclusion:
The company shall have no obligation under this policy (1) to settle or
defend any claim or suit against any insured alleging actual or
threatened injury or damage of any nature or kind to persons or prop-
erty which arises out of or would not have occurred but for the pollution
hazard: (2) to pay any damages, judgments, settlements, losses, costs or
expenses of any kind or nature that may be awarded or incurred by rea-
son of any such claim or suit or any such actual or threatened injury or
damage; (3) for any losses, costs or expenses arising out of any obligation,
order, direction or request of or upon any insured, including but not lim-
ited to any government obligation, order, direction or request, to test for,
monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize irritants,
contaminants or pollutants.
"Pollution hazard" means an actual exposure or threat of exposure
to the corrosive, toxic or other harmful properties of any solid, liquid,
gaseous or thermal pollutants, contaminants, irritants or toxic sub-
stances, including smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids or alkalis, and waste
materials consisting of or containing any of the foregoing arising out of
the discharge, dispersal or release or escape of any of the aforementioned
irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere
or any water course or body of water. Waste material includes any
materials which are intended to be or have been recycled, reconditioned
or reclaimed.
Mack, supra note 23, at 489-90.
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expose them to risk of environmental contamination. The result will
be to deter many desirable business activities that carry risk by in-
creasing the costs associated with those activities. In some cases, in-
ability to insure against such risks in the future may ultimately result
in the elimination of the activity altogether.149
There is no simple solution to the complex problem of who should
pay for cleanup of property contaminated by hazardous waste. Indus-
try must be encouraged to minimize pollution, and imposing liability
on industrial polluters provides a powerful disincentive for activities
leading to environmental contamination. 5 0 Some suggest that impos-
ing liability on insurers for environmental pollution will encourage in-
dustry to minimize activities resulting in pollution because insurers
will monitor those activities, and insurance premiums will presumably
reflect the risk of those activities. However, today "pollution liability"
is a virtually uninsurable risk because the risk is simply too high and
too uncertain.15' If the ultimate policy goal of state and federal envi-
ronmental laws is to achieve an efficient and rapid clean up of hazard-
ous waste sites, then ways must be found to address the uncertainty of
insurer liability for environmental damage, and to minimize incen-
tives for expensive litigation between insurers and insureds that ulti-
mate delays those cleanup goals.
The insurance industry has proposed changes in the current
Superfund program to address some of their concerns. One proposal
by the American International Group (AIG) suggests replacing the
current retroactive liability system for old sites with a national envi-
ronmental trust fund (NETF). The NETF would be financed across
all economic sectors, without regard to site-specific liability, and used
to finance the cleanup of old Superfund sites. 5 2 The fund would be
broad-based, and financed by a separate earmarked fee added to all
commercial insurance premiums within the U.S. The proposal, how-
ever, would not abolish the Superfund liability system for current and
future waste disposal, in order to safeguard the deterrent effect on
environmentally irresponsible waste disposal by retaining a "polluter
pays" concept. The AIG maintains that its NETF proposal would re-
duce transaction costs and minimize the inequities of Superfund's
strict, joint and retroactive liability system. It would also allow the
EPA to devote more resources to cleanup tasks rather than litigation
and fund-raising, and create a national oversight committee that
149. This has occurred in the context of product-liability actions-for example, Dow-
Corning's recent decision to cease manufacturing the silicone breast implant.
150. Thus removing liability also removes a disincentive for pollution. Note, Environ-
mental Cleanup Costs and Insurance: Seeking a Solution, supra note 18, at 731.
151. IdA. at 728
152. "Superfund Issues Forum Putting Cleanup First: The National Environmental
Trust Fund," June 1991, available from the American International Group, Inc.,
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 900, Washington, D.C. 20004.
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would enforce high standards of accountability.153
The AIG proposal is one attempt to address the problem of insurer
liability and to reach the ultimate goal of site cleanup in a way that
will avoid the costs of a litigation-generating liability system.'5 4 Re-
placing Superfund with an environmental response fund which would
pay for cleanup costs and compensate parties claiming damages from
past pollution on a no-fault basis would minimize the incentive for
companies to sue insurers.15S Combining the proposal with incentives
for pollution prevention also would provide a practical solution to re-
ducing legal costs so prevalent in pollution liability.156
Superfund is scheduled for reauthorization in 1995. In the mean
time, various proposals have been introduced which would exempt
various parties from liability under the statute, including exemption
of transporters and generators of "municipal solid waste" from third
party contribution suits,157 and federal legislation that would relieve
certain municipal governments from Superfund liability.158 Recently,
the lending community won some relief from Superfund liability
when the EPA issued a final rule clarifying the circumstances under
which financial institutions may be exempt from Superfund liability
for sites managed or acquired through foreclosure.159 But attempting
to address the individual concerns of industry, lenders, municipalities,
insurers, and others under the Superfund program will at best provide
only a piecemeal solution to the current frenzy of litigation generated
by CERCLA. There is a need to address, in a comprehensive fashion,
the joint, several, and strict liability provisions of the Act that contrib-
ute to the expensive and protracted legal battles between PRPs and
between a PRP and its insurer. A "no fault" system for cleaning up
153. Id.
154. The proposal, however, is not without critics who complain that the NETF would
tax all holders of liability insurance equally, regardless of the likelihood of incur-
ring pollution liability. Others see it as simply a way for insurance companies to
avoid financial responsibility. Note, Environmental Cleanup Costs and Insur-
ance: Seeking a Solution, supra note 18, at 723.
155. Id. at 728-29.
156. Id. at 724.
157. S.1557, introduced by Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) would give EPA exclusive
authority to bring contribution actions against municipalities. Conference on Mu-
nicipal Liability Planned; EPA to Develop Cost Allocation Guidelines, Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 22, at 1368 (Sept. 27, 1991).
158. HR 3026, introduced by Rep. Toricelli (D-NJ) is a companion measure to S 1557.
Municipalities, Industry Spar Over Bill to "Fine Tune" CERCLA Liability, Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 827 (Aug. 2, 1991).
159. 57 Fed. Reg. 18344 (1992). The final lender liability rule clarifies when financial
institutions are exempt from Superfund liability for sites they acquire. Final
Lender Liability Rule Released; Keeps Proposal's Structure, Inten4 EPA Says, 23
Env't Rptr (BNA) No. 1, at 3 (May 1, 1992).
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old sites, based on fair and workable assessment standards160 and
funded along the lines of the NETF proposal, would benefit both in-
surers and insureds by decreasing incentives for litigation and bring-
ing about a more swift and cost-effective cleanup of hazardous waste
sites throughout the country.
In an attempt to spread the burden of the costs of cleaning the en-
vironment, courts have expanded insurer coverage for environmental
cleanup costs through interpretation of standard CGL policy language.
Extension of insurer liability for environmental cleanup costs under a
"continuous trigger" interpretation of "occurrence" in the standard
CGL policy exemplifies judicial implementation of a public policy to
maximize insurer liability for CERCLA cleanup costs. Expansion of
insurer liability, however, has added to an environment of heightened
litigation where much money is expended on avoiding liability under
federal and state environmental law rather than addressing actual site
cleanup. As the time for reauthorization of Superfund approaches, it
is time to develop a cooperative, rather than adversarial approach to
environmental cleanup. Simply shifting the burden of liability from
one group to another under the present system will not provide a solu-
tion to the enormous transaction costs and litigation delays associated
with the current Superfund program. Replacing the current litiga-
tion-based liability system for old sites with a national environmental
trust fund which would eliminate the need for companies to sue insur-
ers, and the need for the EPA to sue responsible parties is an idea
worth serious consideration.161
160. Note, Environmental Cleanup Costs and Insurance: Seeking a Solution, supra
note 18, at 722.
161. Under one proposal for an "environmental response fund" (an "ERF" modeled
after the NETF proposed by AMG), the EPA would not need to sue the companies
responsible because it would have already collected the assessment from which it
will pay for the cleanup. Participation in the fund would be mandatory, and as-
sessments would be made according to criteria reflecting a company's individual
probability of causing an environmental hazard, and would be treated as tax reve-
nues used to clean up environmental contamination. Id. at 728.
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